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Retribution and the Experience of 
Punishment 
John Bronsteen†,  
Christopher Buccafusco††,  
and Jonathan S. Masur††† 
INTRODUCTION 
The law regulates human life, so it should be informed by the best 
available understanding of how people experience their lives. The new field of 
hedonic psychology has made breakthroughs in improving that understanding, 
and it would be natural for scholars and policymakers to incorporate those 
improvements into their approaches to legal questions.
1
 
One such breakthrough involves psychological evidence suggesting that 
people adapt to imprisonment and monetary fines.
2
 People initially experience 
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1. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur (―BBM‖), Welfare as 
Happiness, 98 1583 (2010) [hereinafter BBM, Welfare as Happiness]; John Bronsteen, 
Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment, 76  1037 
(2009) [hereinafter BBM, Happiness and Punishment]; John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco 
& Jonathan S. Masur, Essay, Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 
1516 (2008) [hereinafter BBM, Hedonic Adaptation]. 
2. BBM, Happiness and Punishment, supra note 1, at 1045–49 (collecting studies). 
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such events negatively, but they adjust quickly and rebound toward their pre-
event levels of subjective well-being. Accordingly, the negative experience 
associated with imprisonment is disproportionately front-loaded such that the 
difference between a one-year sentence and a two-year sentence is not nearly as 
great as had previously been assumed. Similarly, there may be only small 
differences between the negative experience typically imposed, respectively, by 
large and small fines. 
If the experience of punishment is different from what it was previously 
thought to be, then the natural conclusion to draw would be that this new 
information is relevant to the way people think about punishment. We take this 
view.
3
 Adaptation is a feature of the typical way in which people experience 
punishment. Our contribution is to point out that this typical experience differs 
from what was supposed and to claim that this new understanding of the typical 
experience matters for the theory and practice of punishment. 
It is important to differentiate our contribution from a separate claim 
about the experience of punishment that has recently received much attention. 
Adam Kolber argues that punishment theory should take account of the 
different ways in which specific offenders actually end up experiencing their 
punishment.
4
 In making that case, Kolber provides some arguments that could 
also support our different claim that the typical experience of punishment is 
relevant to punishment theory.
5
 To the limited extent to which our arguments 
may thus overlap with his, we of course give credit to Kolber for having made 
the points.
6
 More than that, it is possible that Kolber is right. The fact that our 
claim differs from his does not mean we disagree with his claim, but merely 
that we take no position on it one way or the other. 
Unlike Kolber, we claim only this: to the extent that adaptation affects the 
experience of punishment that the typical person is expected to have, adaptation 
is relevant to punishment.
7
 When legislators and members of sentencing 
commissions decide how to choose punishments that constitute appropriate 
responses to given crimes, the findings of hedonic psychology regarding 
adaptation should influence their decisions. This claim is entirely compatible 
with both retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment. Indeed, the point of 
our initial article on this topic is that either type of theory would be improved 
 
3. Id. 
4. Adam J. Kolber, Essay, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109  
182 (2009); Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89  1565 
(2009). 
5. BBM, Happiness and Punishment, supra note 1, at 1069 (―According to Kolber, 
different individuals‘ experiences of punishment must be taken into account. His arguments to that 
end support our contentions as well, and we refer readers to those arguments.‖). 
6. Id. (―[W]e credit his position.‖). 
7. Id. (―[E]ven if a retributivist were to reject Kolber‘s claims by saying that the only 
relevant consideration is the way that a typical person would experience punishment, hedonic 
adaptation would still be relevant because it affects that typical experience.‖). 
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by taking account of adaptation.
8
 
In response to our prior work, a number of retributivist scholars have 
begun to examine the role of subjective experience in retributivist theory. For 
instance, in a recent paper, Dan Markel and Chad Flanders (―MF‖) do not deny 
that adaptation could be relevant to the legislative tailoring of punishments.
9
 
Nevertheless, they deny the importance of adaptation to retributivist 
punishment theory.
10
 They claim that punishment is used to communicate 
condemnation to offenders, and they acknowledge that the typical experience 
of punishment may have some limited relevance to the legislature‘s goal of 
crafting punishments that communicate appropriate amounts of 
condemnation.
11
 However, MF argue that this typical experience does not 
affect much the way that a reasonable person will view the condemnatory 
message of punishment, and therefore the experience has little relevance to 
punishment theory.
12
 Relatedly, David Gray argues that punishments should be 
measured purely in objective terms—for instance, by the number of years an 
offender must serve in prison—and thus that the typical experience of any 
actual prisoner is irrelevant to the calculus.
13
 
We believe, to the contrary, that if adaptation significantly affects the way 
that a typical person experiences punishment, then that fact must be central to 
any persuasive retributivist theory of punishment. Our society tailors 
punishments to fit crimes primarily by adjusting the size of fines and the 
duration of imprisonments. Criminal punishment as we know it is thus pred-
icated on the assumption that the severity of punishments can be shaped in a 
meaningful way by these adjustments. If we are right that (a) adaptation means 
larger fines and longer incarcerations do not typically impose as much added 
negative experience as was assumed, and (b) this fact affects the capacity of our 
penal system to achieve its goal of proportionality in punishment, then there is 
a major problem with the standard assumptions about modern criminal justice. 
MF‘s project does not involve disputing (a)—that larger fines and longer 
prison terms are not as painful as believed.
14
 They are left, then, to dispute 
 
 8. Id. at 1055–68 (utilitarian theories), 1068–80 (retributive theories). 
 9. See Dan Markel & Chad Flanders (―MF‖), Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of 
Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 907, 910 (2010) [hereinafter MF, Bentham 
on Stilts] (―[W]e agree that retributivist policymakers should be sensitive to knowledge of human 
psychology and social norms when crafting laws and setting sentencing policy . . . .‖). 
10. Id. at 910–11 (―[O]ur ‗concessions‘ to the importance of subjectivity are minor and 
provide little basis for debate.‖), 914 n.26 (―[W]hat is novel and nontrivial in what [the 
subjectivists] say is, in our opinion, false or unpersuasive.‖). 
11. Id. at 911. 
12. See, e.g., id. at 973 (―[S]ociety is justified in believing that more (objective) 
punishment communicates a stronger message of condemnation.‖). 
13. David C. Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63  (forthcoming 2010) 
(manuscript at 145–46) (on file with authors) (―Neither is the amount or degree of suffering 
experienced subjectively by an offender the measure of punishment. Rather, punishment is the 
objectively determined, logical consequence of a crime. . . .‖). 
14. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 924–25 n.64 (―[W]e do not intend to register a 
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(b)—that this fact impacts attempts to achieve proportionality in punishment. 
We take up this argument in Part I, where we argue that punishment 
communicates condemnation because and insofar as it is associated with 
negative experience. Indeed, a larger fine or longer imprisonment constitutes 
more punishment than a smaller or shorter one simply because it typically 
imposes a greater negative experience—contra Gray, MF, and others. If 
adaptation changes the typical negative experience of punishment, then it 
changes punishment‘s communicative message. Of course, the message might 
be unaffected if people remained unaware of adaptation, but only because the 
people would believe incorrectly that negative experience was being imposed 
as they had previously assumed. A punishment theory cannot be persuasive if it 
assigns no value to the accuracy of people‘s beliefs on this score. 
Additionally, unlike MF and Gray,
15
 we claim in Part II that in calculating 
the severity of its chosen punishments, society should not ignore the typical 
effects that incarceration has on offenders‘ lives after prison. The state is 
responsible for the foreseeable, proximately caused effects of punishment—
effects that the typical offender will understand to be part of her punishment—
and this responsibility should influence the legislative crafting of punishments. 
Neither society nor punishment theory should turn a blind eye to the suffering 
incarceration is known to cause after offenders have been released from 
confinement, and there is no good reason to exclude this consideration from the 
framing of punishments in the first place.  
In this Article, we defend and expand upon these arguments. MF‘s work 
serves as a point of departure, largely because it frames many of the key 
questions in stark relief. Our aims, however, are much broader. In addressing 
their claims, along with Gray‘s, we engage more generally with the sorts of 
arguments that retributivists might make in attempting to resist hedonic‘s 
psychology‘s significance for retributivism. We demonstrate that retributivism 
cannot be divorced from the expected punitive experience of the typical 
offender. Rather, the assignment of punishments to crimes depends directly on 
that typical experience. 
This is, of course, not to say that all or even many retributivists will adopt 
the positions against which we argue below. We suspect that many will agree 
with our position or will disagree with it on separate grounds. Whenever we 
employ the term ―retributivists,‖ we do not mean to implicate every scholar 
working within that philosophical tradition, but only those who would adopt the 
position we dispute. 
If we are right that adaptation substantially undercuts the capacity of 
current penal sanctions to impose proportional punishments, then that fact must 
be confronted by anyone who values proportionality. Either new punishments 
 
substantial quarrel with the accuracy of the empirical work cited and relied on by BBM[.]‖). 
15. Id. at 968–73. 
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should be conceived that resist adaptation, or else society must rethink the 
value it places on proportionality. 
I 
THE RELEVANCE OF ADAPTATION TO RETRIBUTIVE PUNISHMENT  
The central question is this: to what extent is it relevant to a retributive 
theory of punishment that people adapt to fines and imprisonment? Virtually all 
retributivists seem to believe that more serious crimes should generally be 
punished more severely than less serious crimes.
16
 Various retributive theories 
supply different reasons for proportionality‘s importance.
17
 For some, such as 
Gray, proportionality is morally right.
18
 For others, like MF, proportionality 
communicates the appropriate level of condemnation to the offender.
19
 
Differences in punishment severity must be sufficiently large if the goals of 
proportionality are to be achieved. Adaptation reduces differences in the 
amount of negative experience typically imposed by differently sized fines or 
incarcerations.
20
 We contend that this fact significantly limits the capacity of 
fines and incarcerations to achieve the goals of proportionality. If we are right, 
then adaptation is important to any punishment theory that values 
proportionality, including Gray‘s and MF‘s theories. 
MF resist this conclusion by arguing that society‘s capacity to 
communicate appropriately proportional levels of condemnation does not 
depend heavily on whether its punishments differ much in the level of negative 
 
16. , 
 129 (2009); see, e.g., Joel 
Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in
 95, 118 (1970) (―[M]ore serious crimes should receive stronger 
disapproval than the less serious ones. . . .‖); Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Proportionality, in 
 128 (R.A. Duff & David Garland eds., 1994) (―Persons convicted of 
crimes of differing gravity should receive punishments correspondingly graded in their degree of 
severity.‖); ,  88 
(1997) (―True enough, retributivists at some point have to answer the ‗how much‘ and ‗what type‘ 
questions for punishments of specific offenses, and they are committed to the principle that 
punishment should be graded in proportion to desert; but they are not committed to any particular 
penalty scheme nor to any particular penalty as being deserved.‖); Richard S. Frase, Limiting 
Retributivism, in 83, 112 Michael Tonry ed., 2004) (―However, 
many . . . systems give too little weight to the important values of uniformity and proportionality . 
. . .‖); , 36 (2001) (―Our intuitions 
suggest that deserved punishment and the amount of punishment someone deserves correlate with 
culpable wrongdoings rather than with a person‘s bad moral character.‖) (emphasis added). 
17. See Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 
 263, 279–84 (2005). 
18. See Gray, supra note 13, at 113. 
19. See MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 910. 
20. In other words, the difference in the amount of negative experience typically imposed 
by a fine of 2X dollars and by a fine of X dollars is far smaller than is typically assumed, and far 
smaller than would be the case absent adaptation. The same goes for a prison sentence of 2X years 
as compared with one of X years. 
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experience typically imposed by those punishments.
21
 On their view, 
punishment is about communicating condemnation. A reasonable person 
understands that a monetary fine of 2X dollars communicates substantially 
more condemnation than a monetary fine of X dollars, and that an incarceration 
of 2X years communicates substantially more condemnation than an 
incarceration of X years. MF‘s point is this: even if new findings about 
adaptation were to reveal that larger fines and incarcerations do not typically 
impose substantially more negative experience than smaller ones, the 
reasonable person would still understand those larger punishments to 
communicate substantially more condemnation than the smaller punishments. 
And because this is true, say MF, adaptation does not matter much for 
punishment theory.
22
 
Our disagreement with MF boils down to two points. First, we believe that 
the reason people understand punishments to communicate condemnation is 
that punishments typically impose negative experience. A fine of 2X is 
understood to communicate substantially more condemnation than a fine of X 
because people believe that the larger fine typically imposes substantially 
greater negative experience. Adaptation renders this belief incorrect, so adapta-
tion crucially affects MF‘s communicative theory of retributive punishment. 
Second, even if adaptation did not affect people‘s understanding of the 
condemnatory message of fines and incarcerations, that would be attributable 
simply to the fact that people wrongly assume that larger punishments impose 
greater negative experience. For MF, it does not matter whether people‘s 
understanding of the condemnatory message is based on a correct belief about 
how punishment affects the typical person. As long as people understand the 
condemnatory message that the state aims to convey, the system of punishment 
is legitimate on MF‘s view.
23
 We think this approach cannot be squared with 
the fact that people care deeply about whether a punishment typically imposes 
negative experience, and not just about whether a punishment is perceived 
incorrectly to do so. Similarly, Gray denies that adaptation is relevant to 
punishment proportionality, but on somewhat different grounds. According to 
Gray‘s Kantian retributivism a criminal deserves to be punished, and the 
amount of punishment that she deserves is ―justified, measured, and described 
solely in objective or perhaps intersubjective terms by reference to the 
offender‘s culpability.‖
24
 Gray provides little aid for determining what these 
objective terms are and how they are to be compared.
25
 Importantly, however, 
 
21. See MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 973 (―[S]ociety is justified in believing that 
more (objective) punishment communicates a stronger message of condemnation.‖). 
22. See id. 
23. There may be other requirements for legitimacy, but they are irrelevant to the 
particulars of our dialogue with MF. 
24. Gray, supra note 13, at 151–52. 
25. The only suggestion that he offers is that the appropriate punishment for theft is to deny 
the offender access to property because the offender‘s action was ―a contradiction to the concept 
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he notes that the offender‘s experience of her punishment is always 
―incidental‖ or ―contingent‖ and thus ―retributivists bear no responsibility for 
justifying that suffering.‖
26
 Our response to Gray proceeds along similar lines 
to our response to MF, and for purposes of brevity we will include the two 
together. In short, both the decisions about which punishments to impose and 
the decisions associated with proportionality must depend on knowledge about 
how those punishments are typically experienced by offenders. Any theory of 
punishment that ignores such experiences (in whole, per Gray, or in part, per 
MF) is faced with insurmountable hardships. 
A. What Feature of Punishment Makes It Punitive? 
For MF, the goal of punishment is to communicate condemnation to the 
offender.
27
 Suppose the state pursued this goal by merely telling offenders that 
their acts were unacceptable. For more serious crimes, the state would tell 
offenders that their acts were particularly unacceptable. Presumably, MF would 
deem such an approach insufficient. But because MF claim that punishment is 
merely about communication, they would need to explain why. 
Perhaps a retributivist would say that punishment, unlike mere verbal 
communication, strongly gets the message across to the offender. Without 
punishment, a reasonable person might not fully understand society‘s 
condemnation of the criminal act. Society can say that it condemns, but unless 
it takes action by punishing, people might not appreciate that the state really 
means what it says. 
If that is why society punishes, then what is it about punishment that 
communicates condemnation? There must be something about punishment that 
goes beyond merely verbally conveying the message, but what? The 
―something‖ is the imposition of negative experience. Punishment 
communicates condemnation, above and beyond verbally telling the offender 
that her act is unacceptable, because and insofar as it is understood to typically 
impose negative experience.
28
 
What do MF think about this? They never say what they think,
29
 which is 
 
of ownership.‖ Id. at 146. We doubt whether Gray truly subscribes to a view of retributivism so 
closely aligned with lex talionis. 
26. Id. at 152. 
27. See MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 946. 
28. Two points should be noted. First, we reiterate our agnosticism about whether the 
actual differing experiences of individual criminals are relevant. Maybe they are, and maybe they 
are not. Either way, what we seek to demonstrate is merely that the typical experience matters in 
framing punishments. Second, whether it matters that people‘s ―understanding‖ of punishment‘s 
message be based on correct assumptions is the issue to which the next Section is devoted. 
29. MF write: ―Retributive punishments are not, on our view, about negative experiences. 
They are about creating the conditions through communicative actions to get the offender to 
understand that his actions are being condemned for violating the rule of law.‖ MF, Bentham on 
Stilts, supra note 9, at 973. Our rejoinder is that the principal condition for understanding the 
communicated message is precisely that something is being imposed on the offender that is 
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peculiar for two reasons. First, their theory is that punishment‘s only goal is to 
communicate condemnation, so one might expect them to say something about 
what feature of punishment makes it condemnatory. Second, if MF believe that 
what matters is communicating condemnation rather than imposing negative 
experience, then it is puzzling that they ignore the obvious rejoinder that 
communicating condemnation is accomplished via imposing negative 
experience. As we wrote in a previous article, ―the reason that liberty 
deprivation constitutes punishment . . . is that it is a negative experience. If it 
were not a negative experience, then it would not be retributively appropriate or 
meaningful and indeed would not be punishment at all.‖
30
 
We believe that a retributivist such as MF might say that fines and 
incarcerations communicate condemnation via the social meaning that has 
become associated with those measures. And we think they would go on to 
argue as follows: part of the reason these punishments are associated with 
condemnation may be that the punishments typically impose negative exper-
ience, but this fact is only one part of the reason the punishments communicate 
condemnation and is not a particularly central part of the reason.
31
 
If this is the argument, then it is important to ask what feature of fines and 
incarcerations causes those measures to communicate condemnation other than 
the fact that those measures are understood to typically impose negative 
experience. What other relevant feature is there? We can imagine two possible 
attempts at an answer, neither of which could salvage MF‘s claims. We address 
them in the following two subsections. 
1. Does Condemnation Derive from the Mere Fact that the State Has Chosen to 
Impose Something in Response to Crime?  
What could it be about fines and incarcerations that communicates 
condemnation, other than that they typically impose negative experience? A 
retributivist might say that the condemnation comes from the mere fact that the 
state has selected these measures as responses to criminal behavior. On this 
 
typically experienced as negative. In the passage just quoted, MF seem to reject that view. But 
they say nothing about what feature of punishment does the communicative work, if it is not the 
imposition of something typically experienced as negative. They drop a footnote ―adverting to 
John Finnis‘ view on the matter,‖ id. at 973 n.236, which they in turn quote in another footnote, 
id. at 922 n.52. Finnis says that ―[t]he essence of punishments . . . is that they subject offenders to 
something contrary to their wills.‖ Id. (quoting John Finnis, Retribution: Punishment’s Formative 
Aim, 44  91, 98 (1999)). But as we have explained in considerable detail elsewhere, 
people‘s will (i.e., what people want) is typically to have positive rather than negative experience; 
and to the extent that will can theoretically diverge from experience, it is the experience that 
matters more. See BBM, Welfare as Happiness, supra note 1.  
30. BBM, Happiness and Punishment, supra note 1, at 1068. 
31. We attribute this approach to MF because we assume their goal is to maintain fidelity 
to their communicative theory while still denying that the experience of punishment is important 
to retributive theory. We think that the latter claim is unsustainable, and if MF prefer to agree with 
us that experience (including adaptation) is important, then so much the better. 
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view, if the state had chosen to give beads to people who commit crimes, then 
the beads would communicate condemnation.
32
 Instead, the state has chosen to 
fine or imprison those who commit crimes, so those measures communicate 
condemnation. That fines and imprisonment, unlike beads, impose negative 
experience is merely a coincidence on this view, rather than a driving force in 
explaining why fines and imprisonments communicate condemnation. 
We find it quite plausible that the mere fact of the state‘s choice to impose 
something in response to crime plays a meaningful role in causing that thing to 
communicate condemnation. But that does not mitigate the need to explain why 
societies so often happen to choose ―something‖ that typically imposes 
negative experience. If retributivists took the tack envisioned in this Section, 
then they would be espousing the view that condemnation has happened to 
become associated with measures that typically impose negative experience, 
but not because those measures typically impose negative experience. History 
could have unfolded differently, they might argue, such that condemnation 
could have become associated with giving money to offenders. Or, according to 
this argument, larger fines and incarcerations could have become associated 
with less condemnation than smaller ones, such that more serious crimes would 
be punished by smaller fines and shorter prison terms than would less serious 
crimes. If such practices had developed historically (which on this view could 
have occurred just as easily as the development of today‘s actual practices), and 
if everyone understood that the practices were used to communicate appropriate 
condemnation, then MF‘s argument would be that those alternative measures 
would constitute a system of punishment just as legitimate as the current one. 
Such a view is entirely implausible. As an initial matter, the ubiquity 
across times and places of penal sanctions that impose negative experience 
cannot be a mere coincidence. In some shaming sanctions, the negative 
experience derives primarily from the communicated condemnation alone, but 
where a punishment does more than brand someone a criminal so as to impose 
shame, the ―more‖ always seems to involve the imposition of something 
typically experienced as negative.
33
 It is not merely a coincidence that parents 
communicate condemnation by acts that children typically dislike rather than 
by acts that children typically like. Similarly, it is not merely a coincidence that 
 
32. It should be noted, for the sake of disentangling the separate issues here, that any 
statement by society that an offender has acted unacceptably is likely to cause negative experience 
for the offender by virtue of the shaming effect of such a statement. The question, though, is this: 
when society chooses to do more than just make a verbal or symbolic statement and instead does 
something to the offender, why does the something always seem to involve the imposition of that 
which is typically experienced as negative? The answer is that the measures society uses to punish 
(i.e., the things that are done beyond the mere statement of condemnation) communicate 
condemnation because and insofar as they impose negative experience. 
33. The word ―always‖ invites counterexamples. We can think of none, but even if a few 
were to exist, their rarity would speak volumes about the connection between punishment and 
negative experience. 
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our society‘s chosen means of communicating condemnation for criminal acts 
are measures (fines and imprisonments) that people typically dislike. If it were 
merely a historical accident, then history would be littered with examples of 
punishments that imposed positive experience rather than negative experience. 
Instead, it makes perfect sense that the negativity of condemnation is 
linked with the imposition of negative experience—a view widely shared by 
retributivists.
34
 The reason it is strange and far-fetched to imagine a state giving 
money to criminals as ―punishment,‖ or imposing smaller fines for more 
serious crimes and larger fines for less serious crimes, is that most people 
recognize that of course punishment communicates condemnation by imposing 
negative experience.
35
 It is elementary that if you want to reward people, then 
you do something that they like, whereas if you want to punish people, then 
you do something that they dislike. If MF choose to dispute such a simple and 
intuitively obvious claim, they will have set themselves a hard row to hoe. 
For the same reason that imposing negative experience communicates 
condemnation, imposing greater negative experience communicates greater 
condemnation than imposing lesser negative experience.
36
 One punishment 
 
34. As Jean Hampton explains, ―The way to communicate to [criminals] that there is a 
barrier of a very special sort against these kinds of actions would seem to be to link performance 
of the actions with what such people care about most—the pursuit of their own pleasure.‖ Jean 
Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, in 
 112, 130 (A. John Simmons et al. eds., 1995). According to von Hirsch,  
The censure and the hard treatment are intertwined in the way punishment is structured. 
A penal measure provides that a specified type of conduct is punishable by certain 
onerous consequences. Those consequences both constitute the hard treatment and 
express the reprobation. Altering those consequences—by raising or lowering the 
penalty on the scale—will alter the degree of censure conveyed.  
von Hirsch, supra note 16, at 124. Similarly, Feinberg writes, ―Given our conventions, of course, 
condemnation is expressed by hard treatment, and the degree of harshness of the latter expresses 
the degree of reprobation of the former.‖ , supra note 16, at 118. Other retributivists are 
largely in accord. See, e.g., ,
 93 (1990) 
(―[F]rom a moral perspective, the measure of punishment is not its objective appearance but its 
subjective impact.‖); ,  4 (1968) (stating that 
punishment ―must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant‖); 
,  228 (2007) (―The question is always whether the 
sanction is typically or characteristically onerous . . . .‖). But see Kenneth W. Simons, 
Retributivists Need Not and Should Not Endorse the Subjectivist Account of Punishment, 109 
 1, 2 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/109/1_ 
Simons.pdf. Douglas Husak equivocates somewhat between these two views. See Douglas N. 
Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37  959, 973 (2000) (―My point is that 
the fit we intuit does not really obtain between crime and punishment, but rather between crime 
(as culpable wrongdoing) and suffering (or deprivation or hardship).‖). 
35. We occasionally, as here, use words such as ―negative experience‖ as shorthand for the 
phrase ―something that is typically experienced as negative.‖ We have been very clear that our 
claims refer to the latter—typical experience. 
36. What we mean by the sentence in the main text is actually this more cumbersome 
formulation: ―For the same reason that imposing something believed to be typically experienced 
as negative communicates condemnation, imposing something believed to be typically 
experienced as more negative communicates greater condemnation than imposing something 
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(―J‖) is greater than another punishment (―K‖)—and communicates greater 
condemnation—only if J is typically experienced as more negative than K. 
When society aims to communicate substantially more condemnation for 
murder than for petty theft, it achieves that aim only if the punishment for 
murder is typically experienced as substantially more negative than the 
punishment for petty theft. Indeed, how would anyone know that ten years in 
prison is a greater punishment (or communicates greater condemnation) than 
five years, otherwise than as judged by (assumptions about) typical negative 
experience? If choosing punishments that impose larger amounts of typical 
negative experience is not the way for society to communicate greater 
condemnation, then what is? Unless society is guided (principally and perhaps 
even exclusively) by the criterion of typical negative experience, there would 
be no way for society to know whether any particular punitive measure is more 
or less severe (and thus communicates more or less condemnation) than any 
other one. 
If retributivists
37
 want to concede that imposing negative experience is 
relevant to communicating condemnation while still insisting that other factors 
are more important to the communicative message, then they must explain what 
those other factors are.
38
 True, the mere fact of doing anything to an offender 
in response to the crime may communicate condemnation. But if that were the 
important thing, then societies could merely tell offenders that their acts were 
unacceptable. That such a practice would seem utterly insufficient to most 
people in most societies reveals the central importance people place on 
punishment‘s imposition of negative experience. 
2. Do Deprivations of Liberty and Property Communicate Condemnation for 
Objective Reasons? 
A retributivist might claim that, beyond merely being imposed in response 
to crime, deprivations of liberty and property communicate condemnation for 
reasons other than that those deprivations are typically associated with negative 
experience. For that matter, a retributivist might maintain that objective 
 
believed to be typically experienced as less negative.‖ As we explain in the next Section, the state 
may be able to communicate condemnation even if people‘s understanding of the message is 
based upon mistaken beliefs about negative experience. But that fact reveals the problems of a 
theory based solely on communication, not the irrelevance of the truth about negative experience. 
37. Again, we do not mean to imply that all or even many retributivists will adopt this 
position. We mean only to describe a position that some retributivists might take so we can 
explain our response to that stance.  
38. In other words, what makes a monetary fine of 2X dollars communicate more condem-
nation than a monetary fine of X dollars? We claim that people‘s understanding of the social 
meaning of these punishments—i.e., that the larger fine communicates greater condemnation than 
the smaller one—derives primarily, if not entirely, from an assumption that the larger fine 
typically imposes more negative experience than the smaller one. If MF believe that the primary 
reason for people‘s understanding of this message is something other than people‘s assumptions 
about typical negative experience, then we would like to know what that ―something‖ is. 
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deprivations of liberty constitute punishment irrespective of whether they 
involve negative experience.
39
 Gray takes this approach.
40
 Of course, anyone 
who wishes to make this argument must still explain what it is about these 
deprivations—apart from the imposition of negative experience—that 
communicates condemnation. We suppose that Gray or MF could try to 
generate a grand metaphysical argument about value wherein liberty and 
property somehow have ―objective‖ value independent of any interaction with 
human experience (or at least independent of the positive experience that 
people associate with having liberty and property). 
But such a project could not succeed because people live life subjectively, 
not objectively.
41
 Depriving people of liberty or property communicates 
condemnation because people enjoy liberty and property.
42
 If society intends an 
act (like punishment) to affect someone‘s life such that she will care about it, 
then that act must be expected to affect her experience of life. An objective 
deprivation thus communicates condemnation only to the degree that it is likely 
to be experienced as negative. 
Consider how difficult it would be to defend a contrary view. One‘s 
argument would have to be that depriving someone of liberty or property would 
communicate condemnation even if people did not typically experience liberty 
and property as positive. On this view, there would have to be some intrinsic 
quality of liberty and property that imbues them with objective value—value 
that does not depend on what people actually like. But what could objective 
value even mean, and what could confer it, and how do people know which 
things are imbued with such value? 
Everyone understands that depriving someone of money communicates 
condemnation whereas depriving her of vermin in her house or mud on her 
clothes does not. The reasoning we have espoused provides a straightforward, 
intuitively persuasive explanation of these facts: people typically like money 
but dislike vermin and mud. By contrast, whoever adopts some sort of objective 
view would have to explain what it is about property that makes it good, and 
about mud or vermin that makes them bad, apart from the fact that people 
typically like one and dislike the others. We believe that such a task cannot be 
accomplished. 
Rather than trying to imagine what arguments could be made for such 
―objective‖ value, we leave it to any retributivists who disagree to advance 
such arguments if they so choose. We have elaborated elsewhere a compre-
hensive theory of human well-being wherein we argue that something can be 
good for a person only insofar as it improves the person‘s subjective experience 
 
39. Importantly, the retributivists cited by Gray do not generally seem to support this 
proposition. See supra note 34. 
40. See Gray, supra note 13, at 131. 
41. BBM, Welfare as Happiness, supra note 1, at 18–20. 
42. See, e.g., Hampton, supra note 34, at 130. 
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of life.
43
 If a retributivist would like to articulate and defend a rival view and in 
doing so reply to the points we made there, we welcome them to do so. 
3. MF’s De Facto Concession that Negative Experience Is the Linchpin of 
Communicating Appropriate Condemnation 
MF themselves have taken a position that endorses, in effect, our claim 
that negative experience is at minimum a highly important feature of 
punishment for communicating condemnation. Depriving someone of money 
communicates condemnation because that deprivation is typically experienced 
as negative.
44
 So it makes sense that MF, like us, deem a monetary fine to be a 
punishment. MF, though, take the position that objective increases in depriva-
tion suffice to communicate greater punishment: ―society is justified in believ-
ing that more (objective) punishment communicates a stronger message of con-
demnation.‖
45
 If that were true, then there would be nothing wrong with simply 
imposing larger fines for more serious crimes and smaller fines for less serious 
crimes. But MF support monetary fines that scale with an offender‘s wealth or 
income, because ―[s]uch sensitivity . . . helps the state better achieve its 
commitment to making the punishment serve as a condemnation register rather 
than as a luxury tax.‖
46
 The question MF should be asking is, why is this so?  
The reason that noncontingent fines communicate insufficient 
condemnation is that they are typically experienced as insufficiently negative 
when they are very small relative to the offender‘s wealth. By supporting fines 
that scale with an offender‘s wealth or income, MF have thus effectively 
acknowledged that expected typical experience drives the condemnatory 
message of proportional punishment. That is, MF have effectively 
acknowledged the truth of our core claim. 
B. Does It Matter Whether People’s Beliefs About Punishment Are Correct? 
Let us take stock of the disputed issues. We claim that punishment is 
linked inextricably with the imposition of something that typically imposes 
negative experience. MF argue that punishment‘s goal is to communicate 
condemnation, not to impose negative experience. We have responded that 
 
43. See generally BBM, Welfare as Happiness, supra note 1. 
44. People adapt quickly to monetary losses, but the initial experience of the loss is 
negative. Ed Diener et al., The Relationship Between Income and Subjective Well-Being: Relative 
or Absolute?, 28  195, 221 (1993); Deborah A. Kermer et al., Loss Aversion 
Is an Affective Forecasting Error, 17  649, 652 (2006). 
45. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 973; see also Gray, supra note 13, at 151–52 
(―[P]unishment for retributivists is, or ought to be, justified, measured, and described solely in 
objective or perhaps intersubjective terms by reference to the offender‘s culpability in a crime. 
The suffering experienced by a particular offender subjected to the punishment he objectively 
deserves is therefore incidental, and retributivists bear no responsibility for justifying that 
suffering.‖). 
46. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 956. 
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punishment communicates condemnation because and insofar as it imposes 
negative experience.  
A retributivist might reply that people will understand punishment‘s 
communicative message so long as they believe that negative experience is 
typically being imposed. Understanding the message depends merely upon 
having the belief and is unaffected by whether the belief is actually true. Thus, 
the communication does not depend upon what the typical experience of 
negativity is, but only upon what it is perceived to be. If the goal of punishment 
is solely to communicate condemnation, then that goal is unaffected by what is 
actually the typical experience of negativity. 
Before we confront this argument, we would like to clarify it a bit. This 
argument involves a heavy focus on the word ―understand.‖
47
 The point is that 
when the state does something to an offender in response to a crime, what 
makes that thing a legitimate punishment is the fact that a reasonable person 
will understand the thing to communicate to the offender a message of 
condemnation.
48
 But such an understanding could be based on a mistaken 
belief. As we argued in the previous Section, the state communicates 
condemnation via imposing something (a fine or an incarceration) that is 
typically experienced as negative. The reason people understand that the state 
is communicating condemnation is that they believe that the fines and 
incarcerations are typically experienced as negative. If it were actually true that 
these measures were not typically experienced as negative, and if people 
learned that truth, then the people might
49
 no longer understand those 
punishments to communicate condemnation.
50
 So long as they do not learn the 
truth, though, they understand that the state is communicating condemnation 
 
47. E.g., id. at 973. 
48. E.g., id. 
49. We use the word ―might‖ because someone could learn the truth while still realizing 
that the state has not learned it, and therefore the person could still understand the message the 
state aims to convey via punishment. By contrast, if everyone really knew that larger fines 
typically impose no more negative experience than smaller fines, then larger fines would cease to 
communicate more condemnation. The extra monetary deprivation would be no different from 
giving someone beads to signify greater condemnation: any communicative message would derive 
from pure symbolism, and whatever was sought to be gained by fining people rather than by 
merely telling them that their acts were especially unacceptable, would not be accomplished. If 
this seems counterintuitive, then that is only because people assume strongly that money 
correlates with positive experience. Like many strong assumptions, this one is called into question 
by empirical evidence. 
Moreover, as we explain below, we believe that if someone learned the truth about adaptation 
while realizing that most other people‘s perceptions (and those of the state) remained unchanged, 
this revelation would matter a lot to the person. Even though the communicative message 
remained intact (due to the state‘s perceptions and those of most people), the legitimacy and 
success of the punishment system would nonetheless be undermined. The truth regarding negative 
experience matters, independent of the perceptions that may persist. 
50. The evidence suggests that fines and incarcerations do typically impose negative 
experience, but that greater ones do not typically impose nearly as much greater negativity than 
lesser ones as is assumed. 
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because they see the state imposing punishments that they believe (albeit 
incorrectly) are typically associated with negative experience. 
People understand that when the state imposes a monetary fine of X 
dollars on an offender, the state is communicating condemnation. If a similarly 
situated offender
51
 commits a significantly more serious crime and the state 
imposes a fine of 2X dollars, then people understand that the state is 
communicating substantially greater condemnation than it communicated via 
the fine of X dollars. Why do people understand this? It is because they believe 
that a fine of 2X typically imposes substantially greater negative experience 
than does a fine of X.
52
 
There is evidence, chronicled in our article Happiness and Punishment, 
that such a belief is wrong.
53
 MF‘s response is to argue that if the claim is true, 
it is nonetheless of only trivial importance to punishment theory.
54
 
Currently in our society, the state fines people 2X in order to punish them 
substantially more than those it fines X. The state does this because it believes 
that a fine of 2X typically imposes substantially more negative experience than 
a fine of X.
55
 Reasonable citizens also believe that the larger fine typically 
imposes substantially greater negative experience, and due to that belief, they 
understand that the state is communicating substantially more condemnation. 
For the sake of argument, MF accept our point that the evidence indicates the 
underlying belief is actually mistaken: a fine of 2X does not typically impose 
substantially more negative experience than a fine of X. On their theory, the 
truth of this underlying belief is irrelevant. (If instead MF accepted that the 
truth of the underlying belief is important, then MF would be accepting that 
hedonic adaptation is important and would thereby be conceding that our 
principal claim is true.) So long as people believe that the larger fine imposes 
substantially more negative experience, they will understand the condemnatory 
message that the state aims to communicate to the criminal. And this 
understanding, on MF‘s account, is everything. If it is predicated on a mistake, 
that matters not a whit. 
The question is whether such a view, which places no premium on the 
truth, is persuasive. We think that it is not, for the following three reasons. 
 
51. That is, someone with equal income and wealth. We mean to bracket the issue of 
scaling fines to wealth. 
52. This is the argument we made in the previous Section. 
53. See BBM, Happiness and Punishment, supra note 1, at 1045–46. 
54. Compare MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 924–25 n.64 (―[W]e do not intend to 
register a substantial quarrel with the accuracy of the empirical work cited and relied on by BBM . 
. . .‖) with id. at 909 (―[W]e argue that these claims are, from a policy perspective, either true but 
of minor significance (since most retributivists will agree with them), or else nontrivial but 
unsound.‖). It is worth pointing out that most retributivists agreeing with something does not 
make it trivial. If MF agree that adaptation should be incorporated into the ex ante framing of 
retributive punishments, then they have thereby acknowledged its importance. 
55. Again, see the previous Section for this argument. 
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First, a theory focusing exclusively on perception
56
 would appeal to very few 
people, be they scholars, policymakers, or members of the public. Suppose a 
person learned that greater fines and incarcerations do not actually impose 
substantially greater negative experience than smaller ones. Would the person 
care about this fact, despite knowing that those larger objective punishments 
convey substantially greater condemnation due to widespread misperceptions
57
 
about the degree of negative experience associated with them? We think most 
people would care a lot about such a revelation, even though it would leave 
untouched the communicative element of punishment. Even if both the state 
and the offenders were harboring the misperception, an onlooker would likely 
be outraged if she realized that, for example, society were assigning to mass 
murderers ex ante punishments that were only slightly more severe (in terms of 
typical negative experience) than those assigned to larcenists.
58
 
Indeed, if a retributivist theory relied solely upon perception, then there 
would be no problem with ―punishments‖ that typically confer huge subjective 
benefits, so long as those punishments are misperceived as imposing negative 
experience. Again, we doubt anyone would deem acceptable such a state of 
affairs. 
Reality, not just perception, matters. To the extent that any theory of 
punishment holds that the experience of punishment is irrelevant—and that 
only people‘s perceptions of it matter—the theory loses its credibility. Whether 
or not the theory would remain ―internally intelligible,‖
59
 we believe that few 
would find it appealing. 
Second, focusing exclusively on perception would constitute only a 
limited rejection of the relevance of adaptation and subjective experience. If 
people‘s perceptions eventually change to accord with reality, such that the 
people understand the message of punishment differently once they realize that 
 
56. We recognize that MF describe their view as focusing on ―understanding,‖ but as we 
have explained, people‘s understanding of the communication can be (and, we believe, actually is) 
predicated on the mistaken perception that, for example, larger fines typically impose substantially 
more negative experience than smaller ones. If MF‘s theory deems important the fact that this 
perception is mistaken, then MF‘s theory deems important hedonic adaptation. If MF‘s theory 
does not deem important the fact that this perception is mistaken, then MF‘s theory is implausible 
because it accords insufficient value to the truth. 
57. To reiterate, MF‘s project is not to dispute the empirical evidence of hedonic adaptation 
but rather to argue that even if it is true, it is of only trivial importance to punishment theory. In 
other words, the question is this: assuming, arguendo, that these widespread misperceptions exist, 
does that matter? The claim that it does not matter is untenable because people care a lot about the 
truth and will be dissatisfied with a theory that does not care about it. 
58. The evidence is actually that incarcerations do typically impose far more negative 
experience than fines. However, very large fines may not impose much more negative experience 
than very small ones. In any event, MF‘s position commits them to claiming that the typical 
experience of punishment does not matter no matter what it is (for example, even if murderers 
typically received nothing worse than larcenists), so long as the truth about this does not affect the 
reasonable person‘s understanding of the state‘s message. 
59. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 909 n.8, 931, 933–934, 936, 948, 948 n.159. 
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adaptation occurs, then a retributivist would have had to acknowledge the 
importance of adaptation. Rejecting adaptation‘s importance is contingent upon 
people‘s continuing misperceptions. 
Third, the communication of condemnation is a two-sided affair involving 
both the public and the offender, and one that takes place throughout the 
punishment, not just at the stage of the initial imposition.
60
 Adaptation thus 
cannot help but affect the communicative message. Even if the general public 
does not understand that prisoners adapt, the prisoners themselves will realize 
that they are adapting in the course of their confinement. Perception cannot 
remain decoupled from reality during the punishment: offenders will perceive 
the reality while they are experiencing it, thereby weakening the condemnatory 
message. If it were true that people adapt to imprisonment such that they 
typically do not experience a ten-year sentence as much worse than a five-year 
sentence, then inmates will realize this fact during their stay in prison and 
cannot be expected to receive the message that the longer sentence represents 
substantially greater condemnation.
61
 
One might object that the prisoners will receive the appropriate 
condemnatory message so long as they think that society believes (albeit 
incorrectly) that longer confinement or larger fines are typically experienced as 
severely more negative than smaller deprivations. But if society can 
communicate severe condemnation without imposing something typically 
experienced as significantly negative, then why would any deprivation at all be 
required? Society could merely tell criminals that their offenses are 
unacceptable and are hereby condemned. By requiring deprivation—indeed, 
deprivation that is typically experienced as negative—society takes the position 
that condemnation can be communicated effectively only if the offenders know 
from the deprivation imposed upon them that their act has been deemed 
unacceptable. The deprivation is therefore essential to the message.
62
 As 
 
60. See id. at 968 (―[U]nder our communicative conception of retributive justice, that 
communication ends when the state stops speaking to the offender via state-sanctioned 
punishment. When the state releases the offender and extinguishes any remaining conditions, it 
has said all it had to say.‖). The clear implication is that the state is not ―done saying all it has to 
say‖ until the offender is released from prison. 
61. To reiterate yet again, MF may not believe that people adapt to prison (although the 
evidence supporting that claim is substantial), but that is beside the point of this dialogue. MF 
have chosen to argue that even if adaptation is true, it is of bare relevance to punishment theory. 
62. We suppose that MF could argue that condemnation is communicated so long as 
offenders think that the public or the state believes the offenders will receive some subjective 
deprivation. If this is MF‘s view, it seems particularly vulnerable to the first two arguments we 
made in this Section—about the problems with basing a theory on perception rather than reality. 
Moreover, such a view seems like a distinctly unappealing theory of punishment. Suppose that 
parents punish their child by making her stay in her room for a time, but it turns out that 
unbeknownst to the parents, the child loves staying in her room. Even if the child understands that 
the parents intend to communicate condemnation, we believe that most people would say that the 
punishment has not worked in some important way. Criminals are not children nor the state their 
parent, but the same point holds true for criminal punishment. 
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explained in the previous Section, this approach makes sense only if the 
deprivation‘s negativity is understood in subjective terms, because people 
experience life only subjectively. Whether the deprivation can be expected to 
convey its intended message thus depends upon the way that a typical offender 
is likely to experience that deprivation. 
C. Putting It All Together 
It is useful to give a brief description and assessment of the state of the 
disagreement between MF and us, refocusing on our claims about adaptation.
63
 
We devote this Section to that assessment. 
1. Proportionality and Hedonic Adaptation 
When the state fines or imprisons people, it does so because it believes 
that fines and imprisonments are typically experienced as negative. Whether 
the state‘s goal is to communicate condemnation or to achieve some other end 
(or a combination thereof), the ends being pursued depend upon the fact that 
the measures used impose negativity. 
Crucially, we believe uncontroversially that it is desirable for the state to 
punish more serious crimes more severely than less serious crimes.
64
 How does 
the state seek to accomplish that goal? It does so by trying to use measures that 
vary appropriately in the amount of negative experience typically imposed: 
larger fines and incarcerations for more serious crimes, and smaller fines and 
incarcerations for less serious crimes. 
Finally, the assumption underlying so much of the penal system—that 
punishments can be tailored to crimes by adjusting the size of the fines and 
incarcerations—is called into question by the evidence of hedonic adaptation. 
The difference between the negative experience imposed by larger and smaller 
fines, or by longer and shorter incarcerations, may not be nearly as large as is 
assumed. Therefore, our system does not achieve the proportionality in 
punishment that it is commonly assumed to achieve. 
Retributivists could accept all of these points and simply incorporate them 
into their general theoretical framework.
65
 Instead, Gray takes the position that 
 
63. It is worth noting, though, that MF‘s criticism goes beyond our emphasis on adaptation 
to the larger issue of the experience of punishment. MF, supra note 9, at 973 (suggesting that the 
aim of punishment is not ―to make the offender suffer negative experiences‖); id. (―[S]ociety is 
justified in believing that more (objective) punishment communicates a stronger message of 
condemnation.‖). 
64. This also means that the state must punish more serious crimes more severely than less 
serious crimes by a sufficient amount. Meaningful proportionality is not achieved if large 
differences in crime severity are met with insufficiently large differences in punishment severity. 
65. Indeed, we suspect that many will. If Gray believes that this is merely the importation 
of utilitarian ideas into retributivism—that it will ―put justice at the whim of instrumental 
considerations,‖ Gray, supra note 13, at 151—he is incorrect. The entire thrust of our argument is 
that a well-founded retributivist theory must take account of the hedonic consequences of 
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punishment is to be measured only in objective terms,
66
 and MF assert that 
―society is justified in believing that more (objective) punishment communic-
ates a stronger message of condemnation.‖
67
 As we have argued in this Part, 
punishment communicates condemnation because it imposes negative exper-
ience; and greater punishments communicate greater condemnation because 
they impose greater negative experience. MF have never said what it could be 
about a larger fine that communicates greater condemnation than a smaller fine 
other than the larger fine‘s imposition of greater negative experience. We do 
not believe that any plausible answer can be supplied. Admittedly, greater fines 
may communicate more condemnation than smaller ones because people 
mistakenly believe those fines impose substantially greater negative exper-
ience. But this fact presents retributivists with a difficult choice.
68
 Either they 
must accept that the truth matters a great deal, and in so doing acknowledge 
that hedonic adaptation matters a great deal (in which case they will have 
conceded the key point); or else they must deny the importance of the truth, in 
which case their theory becomes implausible and intuitively unappealing. 
2. The Implications of Hedonic Adaptation 
We do not offer specific or concrete prescriptions for the practice of 
punishment. Instead, we describe a phenomenon so as to help people 
understand better what punishment actually does. 
What should be done about this phenomenon? The evidence suggests that 
current penal practices do not achieve the level of proportionality in 
punishment that would be the case absent adaptation. Larger fines, for example, 
are not much more severe punishments (in terms of the typical negative 
experience imposed—i.e., the terms that matter) than smaller fines. If society 
takes proportionality very seriously—that is, if it cares a lot about punishing 
more serious crimes substantially more severely than less serious crimes—then 
society might try to devise punishments that would resist adaptation. Such 
punishments exist, but it would take creative thinking to find ones that comport 
with the other demands of the criminal justice system. 
If it turns out that any changes that solve the proportionality problem 
would create other problems, then the forced tradeoffs would sharpen our 
understanding of which values matter most in the penal system. Perhaps people 
would prefer to sacrifice proportionality to other values, or vice versa. In any 
event, those who theorize about punishment or who seek to improve penal 
policy must grapple with these questions. 
 
punishment based upon retributivism‘s own principles. 
66. Id. at 140 (―[R]etributivism defines punishment as a restraint on liberty or other 
consequence that is determined and justified objectively by reference to a culpable offense.‖). 
67. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 973. 
68. Again, we do not mean to imply that all or even many retributivists will adopt this 
position.  
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II 
WHAT ―COUNTS‖ IN THE PROPORTIONALITY CALCULUS: THE CASE OF POST-
PRISON OUTCOMES 
We have argued that retributive theories of punishment value 
proportionality and that such accounts must incorporate offenders‘ expected 
experiences of punishment. Gray and MF argue that most of the typical post-
prison consequences of incarceration that we identified in Happiness and 
Punishment—including the generally less adaptable effects of disease, 
unemployment, and dissolution of family and social relationships—should be 
excluded from the calculus of proportionality.
69
 In this Part we show why any 
retributive theory of punishment, including Gray‘s and MF‘s, should account 
for the expected negative hedonic effects associated with illness, 
unemployment, strained social relations, or any other detriments
70
 that are 
proximately caused by prison and reasonably foreseeable to state authorities. 
A. State Responsibility for Post-Prison Outcomes 
To whatever extent they admit that offenders‘ typical responses to prison 
might matter ex ante, MF reject our argument that the long-term hedonic 
consequences of having been in prison are relevant to a retributivist 
proportionality calculus.
71
 Their conclusion is based on the claim that the state 
is only responsible for those harms it has caused, and that the harms we 
identified are not caused by prison.
72
 Furthermore, they argue that their 
communicative theory of retribution implies that when the state stops 
―speaking‖ to the offender through its imposed punishment, the communication 
ends.
73
 We agree with MF that for harms to ―count‖
74
 in the proportionality 
calculus, they must have been caused by punishment. We contend, however, 
that state sanctions do cause the harms discussed in Happiness and Punishment. 
Additionally, we show that, by MF‘s own lights, the state‘s intent to cease 
communication cannot be determinative: if MF are going to reap the benefits of 
a communicative theory of retribution, they must also contemplate the other 
reasonable understandings of the state‘s message. 
 
69. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 967–73; Gray, supra note 13, at 130. 
70. See, e.g., BBM, Happiness and Punishment, supra note 1, at 1049–53. 
71. As we argue in Happiness and Punishment, these post-incarceration consequences 
differ from the prison experience by being largely unadaptable. Id. at 1052. The effects of disease, 
unemployment, and lost social and family ties will likely be felt for a considerable time after an 
inmate has been released. 
72. See MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 968. 
73. See id. 
74. By ―count‖ we mean harms that are ―relevant for purposes of proportionality‖ or harms 
for which ―the state bears responsibility.‖ 
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1. Proximate Cause in the State Punishment Context 
According to MF, when a state justifies the amount of punishment that it 
imposes on an offender, it need only count those harms that it causes.
75
 MF 
claim that because the post-prison harms we have described are not 
proximately caused by some aspect of the state‘s chosen punitive method, they 
can be ignored for purposes of proportionality. We agree with MF that a 
proximate cause analysis is essential for determining the scope of 
proportionality,
76
 but we disagree with their view that the offender or a third 
party, and not incarceration, is the proximate cause of most of the harms asso-
ciated with disease,
77
 unemployment, and strained family and social relations.  
In both criminal and tort law, an agent will only be held responsible for 
consequences that she has caused.
78
 The causation inquiry includes two 
determinations, often labeled factual cause and proximate cause.
79
 The first 
inquiry typically asks whether certain consequences would have occurred but 
for the agent‘s conduct. This is generally uncomplicated, and since 
retributivists seem to admit that incarceration is a factual cause of most post-
prison outcomes,
80
 we will not argue it.
81
 But not all factual causes should 
result in moral or legal liability. Some causes are insufficiently related to their 
effects such that it would be unfair to hold the agent responsible for them. The 
proximate cause inquiry thus attempts to determine when it is fair to hold the 
agent responsible.
82
  
Various standards have been proposed for making this determination, but 
they each focus on general intuitions of fairness: Was the act a ―substantial 
factor‖ in bringing about the harm? Was the harm ―too remote or accidental‖ or 
―unforeseeable‖ in time or manner of occurrence? Were there ―intervening‖ or 
―supervening‖ acts that ―break the causal chain‖? Or were the consequences a 
 
75. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 968 (―proximately caused‖). 
76. Gray misses this point entirely when he suggests that we might believe that all types of 
suffering constitute punishment. Gray lists being struck down by the flu, cancer, lightning, or a 
bus as examples of suffering that are not punishment. Gray, supra note 13, at 127. Quite obviously 
none of that suffering was proximately caused by the state. 
77. MF‘s opinion about disease is unclear. They write: ―[W]e think that diseases or 
disabilities contracted by an offender during punishment on account of poor or squalid conditions 
of confinement raise different issues.‖ MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 971 n.230. They do 
not, however, indicate what those issues might be. 
78. See generally ,  (2d ed. 
1985); ,  (2009). 
79 ,  332 (4th ed. 2003). 
80. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 971 (―It may even be that but for the state‘s 
punishment of the offender, the offender would not experience those harms . . . .‖).  
81. Obviously, not all negative post-prison outcomes will be factually caused by 
incarceration. For example, an offender‘s wife might divorce him not because he was incarcerated 
but because he murdered her family.  
82. See generally , supra note 78. 
BBM.FINAL.doc (Do Not Delete) 10/27/2010  4:17 PM 
1484 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  98:1463 
―response‖ to the act or merely a ―coincidence‖?
83
 Although these standards 
were developed for determining whether people should be held responsible for 
crimes or torts, they are also helpful for assigning responsibility for a state‘s 
punishment decisions.
84
 Just as legal policy and general intuitions of fairness 
limit an individual‘s civil and criminal liability to the harms that she 
proximately causes, we can also establish the boundaries of a state‘s 
responsibility for its punishment decisions by considering whether the harms 
imposed on prisoners are foreseeable.  
Before we turn to the specific post-prison effects that we identified, two 
examples may help clarify our account of how the proximate cause analysis 
should function for purposes of punishment proportionality. Imagine, for 
example, that Alistair is sentenced to five years in prison. When his sentence 
ends on Wednesday, he is led to the door of the prison and allowed to leave. 
Immediately upon setting foot outside the prison door, however, he is run over 
by a passing truck and dies. But for his imprisonment, Alistair would not have 
been in a position to be hit by the truck, and had he been released on Tuesday 
he would not have been killed. Although being released on Wednesday has 
resulted in substantially more harm to Alistair, no one would believe that the 
state bears any responsibility for the resulting disproportionality (because the 
consequences were too remote, were unforeseeable, or were the effect of an 
intervening cause).  
In contrast, imagine Bernice, who has been placed in solitary confinement 
in a dark cell with no access to light for the entirety of her one-year prison 
term.
85
 At the end of her prison term, she is led to the prison door and released. 
Immediately upon exiting the prison, Bernice‘s eyes are exposed to a bright, 
sunny day. Unfortunately, the light is too bright—it damages her eyes, resulting 
in permanent blindness. We assume that everyone would agree that in this case, 
although Bernice‘s harm occurred after her release from prison, the punitive 
methods applied to her were the proximate cause of her injury. Her blindness 
was foreseeable, and it did not occur remotely in space or time. There were no 
supervening causes, and the method of incarceration was a substantial factor in 
bringing about the injury.  
2. The Irony of Incarceration 
We believe that the negative outcomes we described in Happiness and 
Punishment more closely resemble Bernice‘s situation than Alistair‘s. Most of 
the communicable diseases that prisoners contract are caused by the prison 
 
83. See , supra note 79, at 336–58. 
84. If MF have another standard of proximate cause in mind, they do not so indicate. 
85. MF might deem this confinement cruel and therefore illegitimate, but that is beside the 
point. Bracketing the issue of the legitimacy of the incarceration itself, the question is whether it is 
additionally unacceptable to have created conditions such that upon release, the offender would 
likely become blind. 
BBM.FINAL.doc (Do Not Delete) 10/27/2010  4:17 PM 
2010] THE EXPERIENCE OF PUNISHMENT 1485 
environment.
86
 When the state places prisoners in an overcrowded prison where 
their chances of contracting a disease are substantially higher than in a properly 
populated facility, the amount that the state is punishing those offenders 
increases.
87
 The higher levels of unemployment and the damage to social 
relationships that are related to having been in prison require more nuanced 
analysis. According to MF, the negative hedonic consequences associated with 
unemployment and lost social relationships ―result from a choice by a third 
party.‖
88
 While we agree that some cases of unemployment or divorce may be 
due to independent decisions to avoid people who have broken the law, we 
think that many of these effects are proximately caused by incarceration itself.  
When the state selects a punishment, it has a considerable number of 
methods available to it, each with its own costs and benefits.
89
 The choice that 
the state makes has implications not just for matters of sentencing policy but 
for ―determining whether a duty to punish has been discharged or perhaps even 
violated.‖
90
 Thus, when a state chooses to incarcerate someone rather than 
employing one of its other available sanctions, it is responsible for the effects 
of incarceration, including the required time that the offender will spend out of 
the workforce. When an incarcerated offender is out of the workforce for a 
considerable period of time, his value as an employee is considerably 
diminished.
91
 His skills in the profession fade, and he is unable to keep up with 
new developments, making him less attractive than other potential employees. 
Although the offender may only feel the effects of the state‘s decision to 
incarcerate him after his release from prison, the manner of his punishment was 
a proximate cause of his harm.  
 
86. Obviously, if an inmate contracts a disease due to his personal choice to engage in risky 
sex that happens to occur within prison, the harm from the disease would not be proximately 
caused by the prison environment. Gray raises the interesting issue of prison sexual violence, 
which he views as an independent criminal act outside of the state‘s responsibility. Gray, supra 
note 13, at 131–32. While independent criminal conduct is obviously relevant to a proximate 
cause inquiry, it is not, on its own, sufficient to break the causal chain. See Brauer v. N.Y. Cent. & 
H.R.R. Co., 103 A. 166 (N.J. 1918). Where that conduct is foreseeable and where other decisions 
by the state potentially increase its likelihood, there are good reasons to hold the state morally 
responsible for even independent criminal acts. 
87. We fail to see how MF‘s willingness to compensate these prisoners via tort remedies 
addresses the issue of whether those prisoners have been punished more. MF, Bentham on Stilts, 
supra note 9, at 971 n.230. 
88. Id. at 971 (emphasis in original).  
89. For example, the state could punish via imprisonment, fines, beatings, shaming, 
probation, community service, or talion, to name a few. On the practice of talion, see 
,  20–24 (2006). 
90. Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the 
Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54  2157, 2163 n.28 (2001).  
91. See Bruce Western, Jeffrey R. Kling & David F. Weiman, The Labor Market 
Consequences of Incarceration, 47  410, 412 (2001); ,
 32–35 (2007). 
See generally ,  (2006). 
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Yet the effects of imprisonment are considerably more pernicious than 
this. As we described in our previous article, prisoners show a surprising ability 
to adapt emotionally to the conditions of their incarceration such that each 
month or year in prison is generally less bad than the one before it.
92
 We noted, 
however, that this adaptation comes at a price upon release.
93
 The coping 
mechanisms that prisoners rely on to adapt to their conditions—distrusting 
others, keeping to themselves, emotional hostility when threatened—prove 
maladaptive on the outside when they return to normal life.
94
 Surely it is fair to 
hold the state responsible for this irony of incarceration, because it created the 
prison conditions that caused the deleterious emotional response.
95
 If the 
psychological deprivations created by the prison environment result in ex-
prisoners who are objectively less attractive employees, spouses, and friends, 
then the state cannot disclaim responsibility for the hardships they experience 
upon release by pointing to decisions made by others not to employ, marry, or 
befriend them.
96
 Given the research that we cite in Happiness and Punishment, 
the psychological hardships experienced by former inmates are foreseeable, 
proximate effects of the nature of their punishment. In many instances, former 
inmates‘ unemployment and social isolation arise directly and predictably from 
the prison environment. Their situation is indistinguishable from that of 
communicable diseases or the Bernice example. Again, because the state 
selects from a spectrum of possible punishments, the state bears responsibility 
for its selection. It must account for the proximately caused costs that its 
choices impose on prisoners. If criminals continue to suffer in the years 
following their release from prison then this quantum of physical and emotional 
pain adds to the severity of their sentences.
97
 Failing to account for this 
additional suffering can lead to severe disproportionality in sentencing regimes. 
 
92. See BBM, Happiness and Punishment, supra note 1, at 1046–49. 
93. See id. at 1051. 
94. See Jason Schnittker & Andrea John, Enduring Stigma: The Long-term Effects of 
Incarceration on Health, 48 J.  115, 117 (2007) (noting that the ―prison 
environment may foster psychological orientations that prevent integration and intimacy, 
including suspicion and aggression‖). 
95. In a reply to Adam Kolber‘s argument that retributivists must accommodate subjective 
experiences into proportionality calculus, Kenneth Simons contends that the state need not adjust 
its punishments to individuals‘ sensitivities because it is not responsible for those sensitivities. 
Simons, supra note 34, at 6. But unlike an inmate‘s claustrophobia, her post-prison psychological 
dysfunction is caused by the prison environment.  
96. This situation is different from one in which the ex-prisoners are less attractive as 
employees, spouses, and friends because of the nature of their offense. In such a case, these harms 
cannot be said to result from state-sanctioned punishment. 
97. MF wonder whether the state should also be responsible for the positive effects of 
prison on prisoners. For example, they ask whether our argument would recognize the benefits a 
prisoner received if, while in prison, he fell in love with his prison guard and married her upon his 
release. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 970. Our response is that of course this would 
matter to punishment proportionality if the typical experience of inmates was to find romantic love 
during the period of their incarceration. It should be quite obvious that prison is generally under-
stood as a negative experience in part because most prisoners do not have such an experience. 
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3. The Echoes of Imprisonment 
MF further contend that, under their communicative theory of 
punishment, once the state has stopped speaking through punishment its 
responsibility ceases as well.
98
 This argument, however, is inconsistent with the 
stated goals and benefits of adopting a communicative theory of retribution.  
Unlike ―just deserts‖ or expressive theories of retribution,
99
 MF‘s 
Confrontational Conception of Retribution (―CCR‖) theory focuses on the 
communicative nature of the punitive sanction. The ability for the state to 
communicate and for the offender to understand the state‘s condemnation is 
one of the ―intrinsic goods‖ of the CCR because it treats offenders as 
responsible moral agents.
100
 Yet the communicative goal of the CCR also 
creates one of its limits: the state cannot punish those who cannot understand 
its communications.
101
 Thus, whereas other retributive theories may not care 
whether and how the offender understands the punitive message, the offender‘s 
understanding is central to the CCR.  
It follows, then, that the state cannot define the content of its messages by 
authorial fiat. To retain the benefit of treating offenders as responsible moral 
agents, the CCR must be willing to accommodate in its definition of 
punishment not just what the state intends to say but all of the reasonable 
understandings of the state‘s message.
102
 Referring to a mentally ill offender 
who could not appreciate that he was about to be executed, MF write, ―The 
retribution would not be internally intelligible if the offender could not 
understand the meaning of the state‘s condemnatory action.‖
103
 Similarly, if the 
offender reasonably understands the state‘s communicative message to include 
the subjective experience of his incarceration and its post-prison effects, then 
the state foregoes the communicative benefit of punishment if it denies the 
prisoner‘s interpretation. To the extent that the state ignores an offender‘s 
reasonable interpretation of the message, it fails to treat her fully as a moral 
agent.  
 
  98. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 968–69 (―[C]ommunication ends when the 
state stops speaking to the offender via state-sanctioned punishment. When the state releases the 
offender and extinguishes any remaining conditions, it has said all it had to say. There is nothing it 
needs to or even tries to communicate after the offender has served his sentence and related 
release conditions.‖). 
  99. An expressive theory of punishment—i.e., where punishment‘s purpose is to express 
society‘s condemnation of the criminal‘s behavior—might be less tied to offenders‘ typical 
experiences, but only insofar as the expression does not depend upon imposition of negative 
experience. BBM, Happiness and Punishment, supra note 1, at 1077. None of the leading 
expressive theories—those of Feinberg, von Hirsch, or Kahan—fit this bill. Each is concerned 
with the offender‘s experience of punishment to some degree. 
100. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 944.  
101. Id. at 946–47. 
102. See infra Part II.B. 
103. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 933.  
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Thus, MF cannot claim for the state the right to specify the meaning of a 
sentence. If a typical ex-convict, years after being released from prison, can be 
expected to feel like she is ―still being punished‖ through her inability to find a 
job and her loss of previous social relations, a communicative theory of 
punishment must credit that interpretation of her punishment if it is reasonable. 
To the extent that the state has knowledge of or could reasonably foresee these 
post-prison outcomes, the ex-convict‘s interpretation begins to look 
increasingly reasonable. We suspect that most people share the intuition that 
when the state causes negative post-prison outcomes through the method of 
punishment it selects, it is reasonable for offenders to believe that the state is 
continuing to communicate its condemnation.
104
 Ignoring offenders‘ reasonable 
interpretations of their punishments thus sacrifices one of the primary 
advantages that the CCR may have over competing theories—its commitment 
to treating convicts as responsible moral agents.  
B. Linking Punishment and State of Mind 
In addition to the foregoing claims about causation, retributivists may 
embed within the definition of punishment some notion of the state‘s state of 
mind: if the punishing authority does not have the required mental state when 
inflicting harm, that harm is not punishment and thus not relevant to 
proportionality. Many retributivists, including MF, require that the punisher 
―intend‖ for a criminal to experience some negative outcome before that 
outcome can be understood as punishment. Thus, according to these 
retributivists, the post-prison effects of imprisonment are not punishment 
because the state did not intend them. We believe this position is untenable. 
Even if a multi-person entity such as ―the state‖ could be understood as having 
a state of mind—which it most likely cannot—there is no basis for requiring 
intent before classifying a harm visited upon a criminal as punishment.
105
 
1. The Incoherence of the “State’s” State of Mind 
The problem of attributing a subjective state of mind to an unaligned 
group of legislators, police, lawyers, judges, and guards who may have widely 
disparate intentions or beliefs severely complicates any attempt to insist that the 
 
104. The reasonableness of the view that the state continues to speak to offenders even 
after incarceration is further buttressed by provisions for expunging criminal records. Presumably 
the state knows that the record continues to communicate something to and about the offender that 
will cease only when the offender‘s record has been wiped clean. 
105. Other scholars have criticized the role of intent in punishment theory and practice as 
well. See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, State Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98 
 1353 (2008); Thomas K. Landry, “Punishment” and the Eighth Amendment, 57 
 1607, 1611 (1996) (embracing a theory that includes as punishment ―all that a 
legislature or sentencer expects and intends a prisoner to endure, including the physical setting of 
confinement and the quality and quantity of life‘s daily incidents (e.g., food, clothing, and 
activities) over which prisoners are denied choice‖). 
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state exhibit a particular mental state. To put it mildly (and to borrow a phrase), 
the state is a ―they,‖ not an ―it.‖
106
 Just as a group of legislators has no singular 
―intent,‖ it is impossible to aggregate the states of mind of the legislators who 
have passed a criminal law, the executive who has signed it into law, and the 
myriad police, prosecutors, judges, wardens, guards, probation officers, and 
other officials who have played some role in enforcing it. Many retributivists 
who include an element of the state‘s state of mind in their description of 
punishment circumvent this problem by requiring only that ―a[ny] human 
being‖ possess the necessary state of mind.
107
 In other words, any person within 
the system will do. This strips the intent requirement of any meaningful bite. 
There is undoubtedly some actor who intends that prisoners suffer negative 
consequences after they are released and contributes to those consequences. 
By contrast, MF do not indicate whose intent they believe is important. 
This question is particularly sticky for their theory because of their emphasis on 
the communicative message of condemnation from the state to the criminal. If 
communication is the touchstone of punishment, which actor within the state 
must intend to communicate the appropriate message? If a legislator who votes 
for a criminal law and the warden who incarcerates an offender express 
disagreement regarding whether the criminal has done anything wrong, has the 
state‘s communicative effort been frustrated? 
Consider the case of prison sexual assault. Officially, of course, sexual 
assault in prison is prohibited by statute: it is a crime, just as much as it would 
be were it to take place outside of prison.
108
 At the same time, legislators 
undoubtedly know that sexual assault is rampant in American prisons. Some of 
them might intend that convicted criminals be subjected to sexual assaults; 
others might find this practice abhorrent (as we do). The same is true for 
judges, wardens, and prison guards, all of whom are undoubtedly aware of the 
prevalence of sexual assault in prison, and all of whom are capable of reducing 
its incidence or facilitating it, depending on the steps they take.
109
 Some of 
these state actors might intend for sexual assaults to take place; others might 
not. How could one possibly determine the state‘s intent?
110
  
 
106. Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as 
Oxymoron, 12  239 (1992). 
107. Hugo Adam Bedau, Feinberg’s Liberal Theory of Punishment, 5  
103, 112 (2001) (observing that Stanley Benn, Antony Flew, H.L.A. Hart, and John Rawls, among 
others, require only that some individual within the penal system intend a particular harm). 
108. See Gray, supra note 13, at 131–32. 
109. Judges might sentence vulnerable prisoners to lower-security facilities (or not); 
wardens might take steps to segregate prisoners who are known to be violent (or not); and so 
forth. 
110. Of course, one might say that ―people intend the likely results of their actions,‖ and 
thus attribute to the state an intention corresponding to whatever outcome was likely from the 
aggregated actions of the thousands of individuals involved. See, e.g., United States v. Calderon-
Pena, 383 F.3d 254, 271 (5th Cir. 2004) (Smith, J., dissenting). Yet this would reduce the state‘s 
―intent‖ to some combination of proximate causation (addressed above) and an inquiry into what 
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We need not wrestle these problems to the ground, for the post-
imprisonment effects of prison constitute punishment under any plausible view 
of the state‘s necessary state of mind, as we will demonstrate. The important 
point is that if MF or other retributivists wish to drag the actual subjective state 
of mind of any state actor into the picture, they must explain why that actor‘s 
mental state is relevant and how it interacts with the mental states of other state 
actors, rather than relying on a fictionalized conception of the state as unitary 
actor. MF are thus burdened with the unenviable task of attempting to explain 
how the subjective intent of a wide variety of people could possibly determine 
whether a punitive message has been sent on behalf of the state. 
2. Retribution, Communication, and Mental States 
The critical question presented by the retributivists‘ attempt to impose 
some type of mental state requirement is what state of mind the state must 
possess. Those retributivists who attach a mental state requirement to the notion 
of punishment generally demand that punishment be ―intentional.‖
111
  
MF appear to agree that the state must intend that the criminal suffer some 
harm or deprivation before that harm constitutes punishment.
112
 But they do not 
offer a full explanation for why the state must intend the post hoc consequences 
of imprisonment. As an initial matter, they admit that the state is morally 
responsible for the reasonably foreseeable effects of its actions.
113
 ―Reasonable 
foreseeability‖ is a far cry from intent; an action may have many reasonably 
foreseeable consequences that the actor does not intend. Indeed, ―reasonable 
foreseeability‖ instead seems to invoke a state of mind more resembling 
negligence.
114
 
If the state is morally responsible for the reasonably foreseeable effects of 
its actions, then on what grounds would retributivists such as MF rule out 
unintended but reasonably foreseeable (or foreseen) consequences? Though 
 
events are reasonably foreseeable (addressed below). At that point, the notion of requiring ―intent‖ 
loses all of its force. 
111. Bedau, supra note 107, at 112 (attributing this view to Benn, Flew, Hart, and Rawls). 
Again, these retributivists demand only that one individual within the penal system have the 
necessary intent. Accordingly, their mental state requirement has little bite. 
112. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 970 (―Because the polity did not intend, 
authorize, or proximately cause these . . . post-punishment experiences or effects, they cannot 
plausibly carry any communicative message . . . .‖). 
113. Id. at 960 (―If Kolber‘s argument here is that retributivists should not disclaim moral 
responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable bad effects proximately caused by the actions and 
omissions over which they have control, we agree.‖). We have already addressed the question of 
which actions the state has ―control‖ over in the preceding Section on causality. See supra Part 
II.A. 
114. Of course, in criminal law the notion of negligence involves a normative component: a 
person is criminally negligent when she should be aware of a ―substantial and unjustifiable risk.‖ 
Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (1962) (emphasis added). Here, we mean no such normative 
judgment; we use the term ―negligence‖ only to indicate that the actor knew or reasonably should 
have known of the harm, as a means of differentiating this state of mind from intent. 
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they never make their position entirely clear, MF appear to rely on grounds 
related to their emphasis on punishment as communication. MF seem to believe 
that communicative punishment inherently requires intent, or at least they mean 
to define it in such terms by fiat.
115
 Along these lines, the state only 
communicates whatever messages it intends to communicate.
116
 
As an initial matter, this theory defies typical scholarly understandings of 
communication. The majority position among scholars of communication is 
that intent is not essential or even significant to communication.
117
 The speaker 
need not intend to send the particular message that the recipient receives, or 
indeed any message at all;
118
 the fact that a message has been sent is 
sufficient.
119
 Scholars even classify unconsciously sent messages as 
communication.
120
 This is a far cry from the intent that MF say is necessary for 
punishment. 
Furthermore, MF‘s conception does not comport with everyday intuitions 
about communication. Imagine a driver stuck in heavy traffic. Cars all around 
her are weaving in and out of lanes, cutting her off repeatedly in attempts to 
gain a few seconds along the packed highway. The driver realizes that she has 
no chance of reaching her destination on schedule and regrets waiting until the 
 
115. See supra Part II.A.3. 
116. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 929. 
117. For a small sampling of the many scholars who hold this position, see, for example, 
Mark L. Knapp et al., Background and Current Trends in the Study of Interpersonal 
Communication, in  3, 14–15 (Mark L. Knapp & 
John A. Daly eds., 3d ed. 2002) (describing a variety of perspectives on defining communication 
within the discipline and outlining broad areas of agreement, including the difficulty of identifying 
―intent‖ as an element of any communicative act); , 
 1–2 (2d ed. 1990) (outlining assumptions behind a working definition 
of communication); ,  6–8 (7th 
ed. 2002) (describing various working definitions of communication, including the view ―that 
communication should include any behaviors that are meaningful to receivers in any way, whether 
intended or not‖); , 
 50 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining that many communication scholars ―include all the 
symbolic means by which one person . . . affects another,‖ regardless of intentionality); 
,  134 (1996) 
(defining ―communication‖ as ―the transmission or exchange of information, signals, messages, or 
data by any means‖); Peter A. Anderson, When One Cannot Not Communicate: A Challenge to 
Motley’s Traditional Communication Postulates, 42  309 (1991) (defining 
communication to include information or signals received, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally sent); Thomas R. Nilson, On Defining Communication, 6  10, 
14–15 (1957) (arguing that an ideal working definition of communication must include 
unintentionally communicated messages); Glen H. Stamp & Mark L. Knapp, The Construct of 
Intent in Interpersonal Communication, 76 Q. J.  282–99 (1990) (describing ―intent‖ as a 
construct). 
118. See, e.g., , supra note 117, at 50. 
119. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 117, at 309. 
120. See, e.g., Nilson, supra note 117, at 14–15; Y. Susan Choi, Heather M. Grey & Nalini 
Ambady, The Glimpsed World: Unintended Communication and Unintended Perception, in 
 334 (Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 2005); 2 
, (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987). 
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last moment and subjecting herself to such traffic. Frustrated, she slams her 
hand down on the center of her steering wheel, unintentionally causing her horn 
to let out a loud blast. Drivers around her turn their heads, assuming she is 
angry with them for their impatient behavior. But the driver is only expressing 
private frustration about her situation; she had no intention to convey any 
sentiment to the motorists surrounding her. 
This is by no means an example of a perfect communication: the recipient 
has misunderstood the message that the speaker meant to communicate. But 
can there be any doubt that a communication has occurred? The driver has sent 
a message, one that surrounding motorists reasonably interpreted as expressing 
anger with their behavior. For her part, the driver, at minimum, should have 
foreseen that slamming her hand down on her steering wheel would trigger her 
horn; in all likelihood, she in fact did foresee (or perhaps even knew to a 
substantial certainty) that this would be the outcome. It is hard to imagine 
anyone believing that the driver did not communicate a message, albeit 
inadvertently. Similarly defying standard intuition is MF‘s contention that the 
state is not communicating when it sends a message that criminals will 
foreseeably understand as punitive.
121
 
It is possible that retributivists in general, or MF in particular, mean to 
ignore both standard intuition and scholarly conceptions of communication and 
simply define a punitive communication as requiring intent. But if this is the 
case they must put forth a persuasive explanation of why intent should be 
required, which they have utterly failed to do. 
Moreover, as we note above, the issue of whether an offender has received 
a condemnatory message is central to MF‘s theory.
122
 If the offender believes 
that the state is communicating its condemnation to him—and if society 
understands the message in the same terms
123
—it is difficult to understand what 
importance could attach to the fictionalized ―intent‖ of a disparate group of 
state actors. Perhaps MF will attempt to supply some rationalization. But it is 
difficult to imagine what that will be, even on MF‘s terms, because their theory 
so thoroughly rests on ordinary notions of disapprobation communicated by the 
state to the individual. 
In the end, we are not convinced that the state‘s mental state is at all 
important to whether the state is punishing a criminal when it inflicts some sort 
of suffering. But we will assume that the state punishes a criminal when it 
 
121. For instance, a prisoner subjected to sexual assault understands that the state has 
incarcerated him in a place where sexual assault is rampant and failed to protect him or allow him 
the means to protect himself. For many such prisoners, the state‘s message of condemnation by 
assault is undoubtedly quite clear. 
122. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 933 (―[T]he value of retribution lies in the 
criminal‘s ability to understand rationally the state‘s desire to repudiate his wrongful claim to be 
above the law.‖). 
123. Id. at 934 (―[R]etributive punishment also performs important coinciding expressive 
functions.‖) (emphasis in original). 
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causes some negative consequence and that negative consequence is at 
minimum reasonably foreseeable. MF admit that the state bears moral 
responsibility for the fate of the criminal when it inflicts some reasonably 
foreseeable harm.
124
 If nothing else, this is a reasonable position of 
compromise. As we demonstrate below, there can be little doubt that the post-
prison consequences of imprisonment—the ―echoes of imprisonment‖—are 
reasonably foreseeable to the state. 
3. The “State’s” Mental State 
What, then, is the proper state of mind to attribute to the state when it 
imposes negative post-prison consequences on former prisoners? At a bare 
minimum, these consequences are reasonably foreseeable to the state, a point 
which MF explicitly accept (at least in some cases).
125
 The negative post-prison 
effects of imprisonment we described in Happiness and Punishment—
disease,
126
 long-term unemployment,
127
 the breakup of marriages and 
difficulties in forming social ties
128
—are not obscure phenomena. Numerous 
studies exist documenting all of these effects, and consensus is developing 
among scholars and other observers that prison causes substantial disruptions in 
post-prison life.
129
 Indeed, as we wrote in Happiness and Punishment, ―it is not 
news that convicted criminals face reduced opportunities—particularly 
economic—after release from prison and are more likely to opt for criminal 
activity as a result.‖
130
 In light of all of this evidence, the consequences of 
imprisonment should be reasonably foreseeable to policymakers in the 
American penal system. 
For the majority of retributive theories, including MF‘s theory of 
retribution as communication, policymakers‘ bare awareness of post-prison 
harms is enough for these effects to constitute punishment. Nonetheless, we 
believe that negative post-prison consequences are more than reasonably 
foreseeable. In most instances, the state
131
 is actually aware that incarceration 
 
124. See supra note 113. 
125. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 968 (conceding that ―in some cases, however, 
the effects are reasonably foreseeable‖). 
126. See Michael Massoglia, Incarceration, Health, and Racial Disparities in Health, 42
275 (2008); Michael Massoglia, Incarceration as Exposure: The Prison, Infectious 
Disease, and Other Stress-Related Illnesses, 49 56 (2008); Schnittker 
& John, supra note 94. 
127. See , supra note 91, at 89–91; Western, Kling & Weiman, supra note 91; 
, supra note 91.  
128. Leonard M. Lopoo & Bruce Western, Incarceration and the Formation and Stability 
of Marital Unions, 67 721 (2005). 
129. See sources cited supra notes 91, 94, and 126–128. 
130. BBM, Happiness and Punishment, supra note 1, at 1067 & n.142 (citing numerous 
studies of sex offenders as a small sampling of the substantial literature on this point). 
131. Of course, as we have explained, we do not believe that it is coherent to describe ―the 
state,‖ a collection of individuals, as having a particular subjective state of mind. But this is MF‘s 
difficulty, not ours. If MF disagree with our analysis, they must first establish a workable 
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creates a substantial risk of disease, long-term unemployment, and the breakup 
of family ties—a state of mind akin to ―recklessness.‖
132
 It is not a mere 
possibility that criminals who leave prison will suffer from post-prison 
deprivations caused by their period of imprisonment; it is highly likely.
133
 In 
addition, there is every reason to believe that the state is well aware of these 
post-prison consequences. State actors would have to be entirely deaf—or del-
iberately indifferent—to the consequences of their decisions to avoid learning 
of the suffering inflicted upon convicted criminals after they leave prison.
134
 
Moreover, state officials regularly behave as if they understand the 
difficulties that prisoners face when reintegrating into society. For instance, 
even jurisdictions that have long since given up on the notion of rehabilitating 
prisoners
135
 still run programs designed to ease former prisoners‘ transitions 
back into life outside prison.
136
 
 
understanding of what it means for a collection of individuals to share a subjective state of mind. 
132. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c) (1962) (―A person acts recklessly . . . when 
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk . . . .‖). Again, we mean no 
normative judgment here. We use the term ―recklessness‖ not to indicate that any harm was 
―substantial and unjustifiable,‖ but to illustrate that the state not only should be aware but is aware 
of the post-prison harms it is causing. We employ this term, familiar to the criminal law, in order 
to provide a benchmark for evaluating the state‘s state of mind. For most crimes an actor‘s 
recklessness is sufficient to establish her guilt. Id. at § 2.02(3). 
133. See sources cited supra notes 91 & 94; see also BBM, Happiness and Punishment, 
supra note 1, at 1049–53. 
134. Scholarly research aside, the problems that former prisoners face upon their release 
from prison have been widely reported in the popular press. See, e.g., Bob Edwards Weekend, 
Sirius Radio (Feb. 28, 2009) (featuring author and ex-convict Louis Ferrante describing the lack 
of job, family, and educational resources available to ex-convicts); Rich Hein, Group Seeks to 
Help Those Freed from Death Row, , Mar. 2, 1999, at 13 (featuring convict 
describing having nothing when he was released from prison); Nathan Koppel & Mark 
Whitehouse, More Ex-Cons on the Streets, Fewer Jobs—States Release More Inmates to Save 
Money Amid the Worst Employment Climate in Years; One Man Sends Out 500 Resumes, 
, Mar. 20, 2010, at A3 (―In most cases . . . ex-cons still get no more than a bus ticket and 
pocket money when they emerge from prison—and are often burdened with parole fees and child-
support debts.‖); Bill Leukhardt, Conference Focuses on Plight of Ex-Convicts, 
, Jan. 16, 2003, at B2 (describing inmates who refuse to leave jail because they have no 
home or job skills); Phil Manzano, Lifestyle Traps Ex-Convicts, , Jan. 25, 1993, at 
A01 (―There‘s no place to get on your feet‖ for ex-convicts.); Dan Pacheco, A Home for Healing: 
Dismas Humanizes the Transition for Parolees, , Dec. 28, 1994, at F-01 (Living) 
(featuring ex-convict describing logistical and emotional difficulties facing recent parolees); Joyce 
Purnick, 19 Years Late, Freedom Has a Bitter Taste, , Oct. 3, 2005, at B1 (featuring 
exonerated prisoner describing having lost his job, wife, retirement benefits, parents, and housing, 
and becoming estranged from his son, as a result of imprisonment). 
135. Rehabilitation has fallen almost completely out of favor as a justification or objective 
of punishment. See ,
 97–101 (8th ed. 2007). 
136. See Shawn Bushway, Urban Institute Reentry Roundtable Discussion Paper, 
Employment Dimensions of Reentry: Understanding the Nexus Between Prisoner Reentry and 
Work (May 19–20, 2003), available at http://www.caction.org/rrt/articles/BUSHWAY-
EMPLOYMENT%20DIMENSIONS.pdf; Office of Justice Programs (Reentry), 
, http://www.reentry.gov/; National Institute of Corrections, Transition from Prison to 
Community Initiative, available at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2002/017520.pdf. 
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There can be little doubt that the effects of imprisonment are at minimum 
reasonably foreseeable to the state, and in all likelihood the state is actually 
aware of them. On either account, these ―echoes of imprisonment‖ form part of 
the state‘s punishment of the criminal. 
C. A Retributive Theory of Comparative Fault? 
In a final attempt to avoid classifying post-prison effects as punishment, 
MF interpose what amounts to a theory of retributive ―comparative fault‖: if the 
criminal could have foreseen and avoided the punitive harm that would result 
from her criminal conduct, then she, and not the state, is responsible for it.
137
 
They explain: ―Importantly, while retributivist institutions bear responsibility 
for what their agents proximately cause, the same maxim or principle applies to 
offenders. To that end, it is reasonable to hold offenders responsible for the bad 
and reasonably foreseen effects they cause.‖
138
 
This argument sounds in theories of comparative negligence that are 
familiar from tort law,
139
 yet it suffers from two decisive flaws. The first is that 
in the criminal law, the joint fault of a second actor is never understood to 
eliminate the first actor‘s responsibility or criminal liability.
140
 If two 
unconnected individuals are involved in recklessly causing the death of a third 
person, they are both guilty of murder, even if the death could not have 
occurred without both of their independent actions.
141
 Even in the majority of 
tort jurisdictions, the joint fault of a second actor only mitigates, and does not 
eliminate, the first actor‘s responsibility.
142
 
If MF‘s only point is the observation that the criminal should bear some of 
the moral responsibility for the consequences of his actions, then we certainly 
agree. But if MF intend to argue that the criminal‘s comparative fault 
completely absolves the state of any responsibility for what penal consequences 
may follow (as apparently they do),
143
 their claim finds no moral or theoretical 
 
137. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 961. 
138. Id. 
139. See generally ,  (3d ed. 1994).  
140. So far as we are aware, the only standard criminal doctrine that incorporates a theory 
of comparative fault (either implicitly or explicitly) is the doctrine of provocation. See, e.g., Maher 
v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862) (allowing a defendant to present evidence that his wife‘s infidelity 
reasonably provoked him to kill). Even there, however, provocation only mitigates the crime the 
defendant has committed; it does not eliminate it. See, e.g.,  § 210.3(1)(b) 
(1962) (classifying a reasonably provoked murder as manslaughter). Of course, the intervening 
actions of one individual may break the chain of proximate causation and thus absolve an earlier 
actor of responsibility. But proximate cause is an issue separate from comparative fault, and one 
that we have already addressed above. See supra Part II.A. 
141. See, e.g., People v. Arzon, 401 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1978) (finding defendant guilty of 
murder even though victims would not have died were it not for a second, unrelated act of arson). 
142. See , supra note 139, at ch. 1 (noting the avalanche of torts jurisdictions 
adopting comparative negligence regimes in the second half of the twentieth century). 
143. MF, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 9, at 971 (arguing that moral blame for contingent 
harms an offender experiences after his state-imposed punishment due to choices of third parties 
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support within the criminal law—the field their theory purports to address.
144
 
Yet this is not the main drawback of MF‘s comparative fault theory. The 
second and larger problem is that it proves far too much. MF believe that if the 
criminal can reasonably avoid a penal harm by simply not committing a crime 
in the first place, that harm is not punishment.
145
 But there is no limitation to 
this principle. Consider the implication of their argument: if the criminal was in 
a better position than the state to avoid the harm of being sent to prison (by 
simply not committing a crime), then prison is not punishment. MF certainly 
could not agree with this claim—and nor would anyone else, we imagine—but 
it is precisely the conclusion their theory of comparative fault compels. For that 
reason alone, it cannot stand. 
CONCLUSION 
Society punishes criminals by imposing negative experiences on them. 
Whatever goals the state seeks thereby to achieve, be they retributive or 
utilitarian, depend upon imposing negative experience in proportion to the 
severity of the crimes committed. To do so, the state should use the best 
evidence available for gauging the typical level of negativity associated with 
punishments such as fines and incarcerations. This includes foreseeable nega-
tive outcomes caused by these punishments, including the harm that lingers 
after inmates complete their time behind bars. To the extent that the goal of 
punishment is to communicate condemnation to offenders, communicating the 
appropriate message depends upon imposing appropriate, proportional levels of 
negative experience. Because the experience of life is subjective, it would be a 
mistake for the law to ignore lessons from social science when deciding how—
and how much—to punish.  
 
should be placed ―on the offender—or, if the harms are unreasonable, on the third parties making 
those choices‖). 
144. It is worth noting again that MF admit that the state is morally responsible for the 
reasonably foreseeable effects of its actions. Id. at 960. Yet MF blithely ignore this moral 
responsibility simply because it is shared with the criminal, who could have refrained from 
committing a crime. This unjustified whitewashing of the state‘s role is, by itself, a sufficient 
reason to reject MF‘s theory. 
145. Id. at 969 (―Moreover, the harmful effects of prison in post-prison life are also 
reasonably foreseeable to competent would-be offenders and they are in the best position to avoid 
those harms, since they can avoid criminality altogether.‖). 
